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Executive summary  
As a contribution to a UK-wide programme on the future shape of local government finance 
being led by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, this paper considers the issue of local retention of 
business rates by local authorities in Wales, and highlights important questions that should be 
asked. In particular, it looks at the argument for retention in the context of the new and 
emerging regional growth partnerships in Wales (City Regions1) and their role in promoting 
regional economic development. In doing so, the paper recognises the new economic and 
financial circumstances which are anticipated following Brexit, and takes into account the 
devolution of fiscal powers to Wales and the impact of the UK Government’s ‘austerity’ policy 
on public spending in Wales and local authority budgets. 
This report describes existing business rates arrangements in Wales, summarises the current 
approaches to business rate retention in England and Scotland, and discusses existing 
proposals for NDR change in Wales. It then explores a conceptual city-region shared-gain 
business rates incentivisation model which would enable regional growth partnerships to 
retain a portion of the business rates they generate and incentivise them to grow their business 
rate tax base.  
Importantly, it should be emphasised that the report does not claim that business rates 
retention itself would necessarily lead to a significant growth in total NDR revenues beyond 
what would happen in the absence of retention. Instead, the report shows how business rates 
retention would lead to gains for the Welsh Government and the councils resulting from any 
extra rates growth due to City Region deals. This provides incentives for councils and Welsh 
Government to support projects related to the City Region and Growth Deals (and more 
broadly) to encourage regional development. 
Underlying the discussion is the trade-off between redistribution on the one hand and 
incentives to grow the tax base on the other, which raises questions of what is a ‘fair’ business 
rate retention system. Is too much business rate revenue divergence detrimental to regional 
cohesion? Is it equitable for some councils to do better and others – much worse? Or are 
differential outcomes appropriate and justified given councils’ differential performance? It 
would be up to policymakers to take a stance on these questions, while keeping in mind the 
economic implications of their decisions. 
 
                                               
1 The term City Regions in this report refers to both the City Region and Growth Deals. 
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Key messages and findings 
The existing NDR scheme in Wales 
 Non-domestic rates constitute a significant element in the local government finance 
system, generating annual revenues of £1 billion in Wales, about 10-15% of total 
net local authority income, and have gained prominence as a source of income as 
Welsh government grants to local government have been cut under austerity. 
 Responsibility for business rates was devolved to the Welsh Government with effect 
from 2015-16. The rates are collected by the councils, put into a Welsh Government 
pool, and then redistributed across local authorities. This means that there is a 
redistributive element in the current system that benefits councils which are poorer 
and have a smaller tax base. 
 Local retention of business rates by local authorities has not historically been a high-
profile issue in Wales, where instead the focus has been on relief schemes to 
mitigate the impact of business rates on small businesses.  
 Two key reports raised the possibility of retention but did not set out specific 
proposals. The argument for retention is that it could incentivise councils to generate 
new developments to increase their local tax base. However, business rate 
retention, without the corresponding adjustment of Revenue Support Grant, also 
has the potential to benefit councils where business rate revenues are rising relative 
to need – these may be the more economically developed councils with higher 
property values and biggest increases in the local tax base. This could therefore 
negatively affect the revenues of poorer councils with less buoyant property 
markets. 
NDR scheme in England and Scotland 
 Changes to business rates introduced in England and Scotland in recent years 
reflect different policy choices. Since 2011, in practical terms, the councils in 
Scotland retain the whole amount of business rates income they generate. In 2012-
13, the Scottish Government introduced an incentive scheme under which a local 
authority retains 50 per cent of any business rates receipts above a set target. There 
is no penalty for councils which fail to meet their target, with the Scottish 
Government meeting any shortfall through the Revenue Support Grant.  
 The approach in England, part of the far-reaching local financing agenda, started in 
2012-13, with a 50 per cent NDR retention scheme and has developed since, with 
75% retention by 2020 and a number of 100 per cent retention pilots already in 
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operation. The 100% retention pilots in effect break the link between business rates 
and the Revenue Support Grant. The England schemes are more complex than 
those in Scotland, among other things reflecting the two-tier Local Government in 
parts of the country and a ‘tariff and top-ups’ approach to equalisation between 
poorer and richer authorities.  
 A key difference between the two approaches is the incentive structure facing 
councils. Under the Scottish system, councils are asymmetrically exposed to risk of 
not meeting their targets. They are rewarded for doing well, but are protected 
against performing poorly, thus weakening the incentives to grow their revenues. 
Under the English system, authorities are exposed to losses as well as gains, which 
may create a stronger incentive for councils to grow their revenues but also exposes 
them to more risk.  
 Evidence shows that the English scheme has exposed the council budgets to 
additional variability on both the upside and the downside, leading to winners and 
losers. In Scotland, the incentive scheme has resulted in relatively modest level of 
funds retained by local authorities who have exceeded their target (average of £6 
million a year). However, it is important to keep the counterfactual policy outcome 
in mind when evaluating the effects of the business rates retention reforms: even if 
some councils gain from retained NDR, they may still lose relative to what they 
would have received if that revenue had been redistributed across councils in the 
absence of retention. 
The City Regions in Wales 
 The establishment of the City Regions (Cardiff Capital and Swansea Bay) has 
reignited the interest in business rate retention.  
 City Region deals in Wales have been established as drivers of economic growth, 
based on major projects that stimulate regional investment. However, the City 
Region deals also raise the risk of deepening the inequalities between councils, 
since the benefits could be unevenly distributed across Wales based on enhanced 
regional competition.  
 Both Cardiff Capital and Swansea Bay City Regions are proposing some degree of 
business rate retention, arguing that retention could help incentivise the City 
Regions to grow their economies and increase their local tax base, generating funds 
for further investment, thus creating a virtuous circle. It is therefore timely to consider 
how a business rate retention scheme in Wales might work. 
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The hypothetical case of 100% NDR retention 
 A simple reform of the existing NDR scheme in Wales could be a 100% business 
rates revenue retention at the local level. In a hypothetical simple case where 
councils retain 100% of business rates and no corresponding adjustment from the 
Revenue Support Grant is made, the retention would likely impact adversely on 
most councils and positively on only a few. 
 With a hypothetical 100% retention, some councils would see their revenue falling 
relative to a fully pooled system while others would record higher revenues. 
Councils with vibrant property markets, higher numbers of companies and higher 
property values, as well as bigger increases in local tax base, would be more likely 
to secure higher NDR revenue. By contrast, councils with less vibrant rental 
structures, lower numbers of enterprises and lower RV, as well as smaller increases 
in the local tax base, would likely experience reduced revenues, irrespective of need 
for local services. 
A city-region shared-gain business rates incentivisation scheme in Wales 
 Instead of retention at council level, a reform which incentivises business rate 
revenue growth resulting from successful local economic development might be 
more attractive for Wales. This is all the more so in a context where Welsh local 
authority revenue funding for economic development fell by 74 per cent over the 
period 2009-10 to 2016-17, as austerity took effect and local authorities sought to 
protect funding for schools and social services. The loss of EU funding in the event 
of Brexit, if not replaced through the UK Government’s proposed Shared Prosperity 
Fund or equivalent, would also mean a significant loss of economic development 
funding. 
 As a starting point, this report discusses two possible ways of organising such a 
shared-gain scheme at the city region footprint. In each case the objective would be 
to incentivise the drive for economic development and strengthen the bond between 
local authorities within the City Region in pursuing shared regional goals.  
 The first option is to apply the Scottish model at the City Regional level. One way in 
which this could be done is to set a city region baseline business rate target, for 
instance on the basis of the growth trend in business rate revenue, and each 
regional partnership would in effect retain the agreed portion of the revenues in 
excess of the target. This ‘Scottish approach’ would focus on the overall growth in 
economic activity as reflected in business rate growth, so not just confined to 
individual capital projects. 
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 An alternative option, an example of which has been advocated by the Swansea 
Bay City Region, would involve the retention of half of the business rates revenues 
yielded by the developments resulting from the city region investment. Such a 
scheme would focus on the business rates yielded by specific projects (e.g. new 
buildings or other tangible assets) created through the growth deals, over and above 
what the City Region would have received in the absence of those projects. 
 The 'project-based’ approach may skew City Regional incentives in favour of 
developing capital projects over other development projects, and it may be difficult 
to attribute which projects are part of the City Deal and which are not. 
 Retained funds in both schemes could be made available to the regional 
partnerships to help finance their activities, taking account of the need for 
economically disadvantaged councils to benefit, with the balance going into the 
national business rates pool for redistribution. 
 Both schemes would provide incentives to increase local economic growth and the 
local tax base, while mitigating the potential negative regional inequality effects of 
the City Regions. 
 As an illustration, under a city regional NDR incentivisation approach, and assuming 
that business rate revenues grow at 1% per year due to the operation of the City 
Regions, Cardiff Capital Region would retain £2.57 million in 2019-20 (the next 
possible financial year of the scheme’s implementation), the Swansea Bay City 
Region would retain £1.14 million, and the North Wales Growth Deal £1.14 million. 
Key issues to note and questions to ask when considering business rates retention in Wales 
 The issue of risk and detriment is crucial – a commitment to ensuring that no local 
authority loses out compared to what it would have received in the absence of 
retention suggests that any scheme has to be a) relatively modest in scope, and b) 
authorities have to be adequately protected while trading off that protection against 
the incentives to take on some risk and to grow their tax bases. 
 There is limited evidence across the UK to date concerning the impact of such NDR 
schemes on the local economy, but it is worth noting that the mainstream political 
parties are all committed to regional economic strategies. Therefore, a thorough 
investigation of the potential impacts of business rates is required. 
 Some operational issues, such as the impact of appeals on business rate income, 
should also be considered; this report notes such issues, but they lie outside the 
scope of the analysis. 
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 Policymakers should aim at striking an appropriate balance between incentives to 
grow the tax base and regional economic performance on the one hand, and 
redistribution to minimise regional inequality on the other. 
  
8 
 
Introduction  
Overview 
In the context of austerity applied by the UK Government in the wake of the 2007 global 
economic crisis and the evolving devolution settlement for Wales, there has been a marked 
divergence in policy for local government finance between London and Cardiff. This has 
included very different approaches to central government funding for local authorities (with 
bigger cuts and a strong push towards self-financing in England as part of a ‘localism’ agenda), 
council tax (more flexibility over increases in Wales) and Non-Domestic Rates (NDR).2 
Broadly, local authority revenue stems from three main sources: central government grants 
(general and specific), council tax, and NDR. While local government finance experienced 
overall revenue cuts since 2009-10, its shape has been diverging among the devolved areas 
(Figure 1). For instance, the contribution of council tax income to the total local government 
revenues has slightly increased in Scotland between 2009-10 and 2015-16, whereas in Wales 
and England it recorded a much greater rise. Indeed, several Welsh councils increased their 
local tax rates to compensate for the reduced Revenue Support Grant (Ogle et al., 2017). 
Figure 1: Sources of Local Government revenues as a percentage of total Local 
Government finance 
 
Source: ONS (2011; 2016), Scottish Government (2011; 2017a), and for Wales: Financing of gross revenue expenditure 
(available here: https://statswales.gov.wales/Catalogue/Local-Government/Finance/Revenue) and in-year council tax collection 
(available here: https://statswales.gov.wales/Catalogue/Local-Government/Finance/CouncilTax/Collection). 
Note: Central Government Grant includes the Council Tax Benefit before 2013-14, and Council Tax Reduction after 2013-14. 
                                               
2 In the rest of this paper, business rates are generally referred to by their more formal term, Non-Domestic Rates. 
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Although there has not been a fundamental shift in the approach to local government finance 
in Wales since devolution, various reviews and studies have discussed the issue (Business 
Rates Task and Finish Group, 2012; Welsh Government, 2012a; Independent Commission 
on Local Government Finance Wales, 2016; Wales Audit Office, 2016; Welsh Government, 
2017a). Specifically, the local retention of NDR revenues was discussed and proposed by the 
Business Rates Task and Finish Group (TFG) in 2012. The Independent Commission on Local 
Government Finance Wales, established by the Welsh Local Government Association 
(WLGA) and the Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA), suggested 
a 100% retention of NDR revenue. The Welsh Government has not agreed to any retention 
scheme since NDR was devolved with effect from 2015-16 but the debate has been reignited 
by the establishment of the Cardiff Capital Region City and Swansea Bay City Region in the 
mid-2010s. These have advocated the retention of NDR revenues above a growth baseline to 
provide extra income to the City Regions (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016; Swansea Bay City, 
2017). 
Scope and structure 
This report analyses the current NDR scheme in Wales and forms part of the wider efforts 
exploring different approaches to local government finance. Based on the evidence of the 
existing schemes in Wales, England, and Scotland, the basic goal of this report is to provide 
careful considerations for changes in the Welsh NDR scheme at the city regional level that the 
Welsh Government could take into account in the direction of providing incentives for 
economic growth, while protecting the budget of all the councils. It should be noted that some 
operational issues, such as the impact of appeals, and the impact of Brexit on business rate 
revenues, lie outside the scope of this analysis. 
By examining the interrelationships between local governance, regional finance and public 
policy across space, this report provides a rigorous review of the existing NDR scheme in 
Wales and its proposed reforms. 
First, it analyses the existing NDR model in Wales and the net difference between NDR 
settlements and contributions across individual local authorities. Second, it presents evidence 
about the NDR schemes in England and Scotland, and reviews the policy discussion to date 
on reforming the NDR scheme in Wales. Third, the report presents suggestions for how a City-
Region shared-gain business rates incentivisation scheme could operate in Wales, and what 
the financial implications of such a scheme might be. 
10 
 
Wales: the existing NDR scheme and its contribution to local 
government finance 
NDR constitute a tax on non-domestic properties (NDP). Total NDR revenues for a council are 
equal to the sum of the NDR that all the users of NDP pay. The business rate for a property is 
calculated by multiplying its Rateable Value (RV) by the NDR multiplier (‘poundage’), minus 
any reliefs for which the property is eligible (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017). The RV is 
assigned by the Valuation Office Agency (VOA) and is equal to the floor area of the premises 
multiplied by the rental value per m2. Starting from 2018-19, the poundage, which is the same 
for all the 22 Welsh councils, is set by the Welsh Government each year in line with the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI)3 according to its level in September of the previous financial year 
to which the poundage refers. The reliefs, which are funded by the Welsh Government, are 
set to reduce the business rates for small businesses, unoccupied properties, and charities. 
Before 2015, NDR, after removing the appeals, used to be pooled with revenues generated in 
England;4 NDR were devolved to the Welsh Government in 2015. Since then, all NDR 
revenues are collected by the councils and are provided to the Welsh Government, which then 
redistributes them to the Local Authorities (LAs), based on their proportion of the population 
aged 18 and over, regardless of the income raised by each LA. The distributable amount of 
NDR revenues is used, alongside the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) and council tax, to 
finance the Local Government budget. NDR revenues are non-hypothecated, being spent by 
the councils to finance their local services and priorities, such as schools and social care. 
The significance of the NDR in Wales has grown since 2009-10, in the context of budget cuts 
implemented by the UK Government to resolve the 2007 global economic crisis. Since then, 
NDR revenue contribution to the Welsh local government annual budgeted income has been 
steadily increasing from 10.9% in 2011-12 to above 12% in 2016-17, at a value of £1 billion 
(Luchinskaya et al., 2017). 
The net difference between the NDR revenues distributed to each LA from the Welsh 
Government pool and the contribution each LA made to the pool was estimated in the period 
between 2000-01 and 2015-165 (from now on, this will be referred to as ‘difference’), using 
outturn data (see Annex 1). Some LAs receive more business rates income than they 
                                               
3 The switch from RPI to CPI for indexation purposes was announced in the Welsh Budget for 2018-19. 
4 Councils collected the NDR and transferred them to the Welsh Government. The latter would pay the business 
rates to the UK Government which would return them to the Welsh Government through the Welsh Block Grant. 
Therefore, NDR used to contribute to the Welsh Block Grant. 
5 The 2015-16 financial year was chosen since it was the latest year that all data for NDR generation and its 
determinants was available. 
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contribute (positive difference), whereas for other councils the contributions exceed the 
settlements (negative difference). Ten LAs have never contributed more NDR revenues than 
they received, whereas seven councils have received less NDR revenue than they contributed 
for more than half of the 16 financial years between 2000-01 and 2015-16 (Table 1). 
In order to paint a detailed picture of the existing NDR scheme in Wales, local authority 
characteristics were examined in relation to the NDR difference. Specifically, the analysis 
looked at the relationship between NDR difference and: gross value-added (GVA), property 
market (rateable value and number of non-domestic properties), unemployment rate, 
population, population density and average earnings, at the LA level. 
According to the results of correlation and regression statistical analysis,6 the councils which 
tend to receive more NDR revenue than they contribute are likely to be the more economically 
underdeveloped, sparsely populated and rural councils, with relatively weak property markets. 
It is likely that these councils have a small tax base and low property prices, recording high 
unemployment, as well as low average earnings of citizens. In contrast, the councils that have 
a negative average NDR difference are likely to be the more economically developed, highly 
populated and urbanised councils. They are likely to have a buoyant property market, 
comparatively large tax base and higher property values, lower unemployment, as well as 
higher average earnings, compared to councils with a positive NDR difference. On balance, 
the existing NDR scheme financially supports the councils which are economically 
disadvantaged. Table 2 summarises the findings, showing a clear split between councils with 
positive and negative NDR difference. 
 
  
                                               
6 The results and detailed analysis can be found in the full report which will be published on the website of Wales 
Public Services 2025 by May 2018. 
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Table 1: Summary of the net difference settlements-contributions for each LA 
 No. of times NDR 
contributions 
exceeded 
settlements (2000-
01 to 2015-16) 
Average net 
difference in cash 
terms (£ million) 
Average net 
difference per 
capita (£) 
Isle of Anglesey 1 2.49 73.75 
Gwynedd  8 0.04 0.36 
Conwy  0 2.52 45.61 
Denbighshire  0 2.82 61.70 
Flintshire  16 -5.81 -78.93 
Wrexham  10 0.05 0.64 
Powys  0 5.28 82.93 
Ceredigion  0 3.06 83.75 
Pembrokeshire  6 -1.26 -20.49 
Carmarthenshire  0 4.87 55.57 
Swansea  9 -0.71 -6.24 
Neath Port Talbot  2 1.32 19.71 
Bridgend  11 -0.33 -5.09 
Vale of Glamorgan  10 -0.65 -11.13 
Rhondda Cynon Taf  0 7.33 64.33 
Merthyr Tydfil  5 0.42 15.35 
Caerphilly  0 6.71 78.48 
Blaenau Gwent  0 3.34 99.04 
Torfaen  0 1.81 40.83 
Monmouthshire  0 2.01 45.87 
Newport  16 -6.93 -99.7 
Cardiff 16 -29.79 -182 
Notes: Average net difference is calculated as average settlements less average contributions, 2000-
01 to 2015-16. Figures are in cash terms. Source: Stats Wales (2018) and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2: A classification of the councils according to the NDR difference 
 Councils with positive NDR 
difference 
Councils with negative NDR 
difference 
Features Economically less strong 
Weak property market 
Small tax base 
Rural councils 
Low property prices 
Low populated 
Low average earnings 
High unemployment 
Economically more strong 
Vibrant property market 
Big tax base 
Urbanised councils 
High property prices 
Highly populated 
High average earnings 
Low unemployment 
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Government policy on business rates in England and Scotland 
UK government policy on business rates in England 
Until 2012-13, NDR revenues in England were collected by the councils, paid to the UK 
Government and then redistributed back to the councils, forming part of their funding from the 
UK Government. According to the report of the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) in 2011, English councils did not have the sufficient certainty to structure 
long-term investment plans as they had no control of the locally raised revenues. Therefore, 
in 2013 the business rates retention scheme (BRRS) was adopted in England in order to 
incentivise local economic and business growth (UK Government, 2012). The provision of 
incentives for local economic growth through the BRRS assumed that the new scheme 
incentivises investment to new developments, buildings and premises, which would bring 
about a rise in the local tax base. 
In 2013-14, the first year of the scheme, a baseline level of funding related to overall NDR was 
estimated for each council. NDR revenue baselines were created for each council, based on 
what councils got through reallocation. This baseline level of funding ensured that each 
council’s revenues did not change as compared to the year of BRRS implementation (Amin-
Smith and Phillips, 2017). In 2013-14, the business rates baseline was estimated, based on 
the gross NDR raised under the retention scheme in 2012-13, the first year of the 
implementation of the scheme, before tariffs and top-ups. Since 2012-13, local government 
retained 50% of the NDR revenues with the remaining 50% paid to the UK Government 
(DCLG, 2012; UK Government, 2012). According to the new regulations accompanying the 
retention scheme, councils whose NDR baselines were higher than their baseline funding level 
had to pay the difference (tariff) to the UK Government (CIPFA, 2013). The UK Government 
then reallocated this tariff as a top-up to those councils whose business rates baseline was 
lower than the baseline funding level (DCLG, 2012).  
Therefore, councils that experience an increase in NDR revenues retain part of the extra 
revenue, while councils that record a decline of NDR revenues keep a proportion of the losses 
(Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017). The amount of gains or losses that each council retains 
depends on two factors: the type of council, and the relative difference between business rates 
baseline and the baseline funding. First, the type of council determines how much of the NDR 
revenue can be kept: metropolitan boroughs and unitary authorities retain 49% (1% is provided 
to the fire authorities), in two-tier local government areas the districts keep up to 40% and 
counties up to 10%, while London boroughs keep up to 30%, and the Greater London Authority 
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– up to 20%. Second, how the business rates baseline level compares to the baseline funding 
also matters: if the business rates baseline is lower than baseline funding, the council retains 
the share (depending on the type of council as explained above). If the business rates baseline 
is higher, the council pays a levy, and the share that it keeps is gradually reduced down to 
50% of the maximum level that a council of that type can retain (Amin-Smith et al., 2016). The 
levies are used to fund a safety net to protect only the councils recording a significant decline 
in NDR revenues – 7.5% below the baseline funding level (CIPFA, 2013). 
Turning to its implications, the BRRS in England has given strong incentives to the councils to 
grow revenues and constrain spending needs (Amin-Smith et al., 2018). However, it has also 
increased the variability and unevenness of the local funding and regional development 
(Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015; Greenhalgh et al., 2016). The BRRS has the potential 
to benefit the budget of the councils with vibrant property markets and negatively affect the 
income of the LAs with less developed rental structures (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 
2015). Moreover, it could benefit the councils with the biggest increases in their tax base in 
cash terms (Amin-Smith et al., 2018). Another problem arises when considering that tariffs 
and top-ups are dependent on inflation,7 whereas non-domestic rates are not, thus 
strengthening the possibility of local funding divergence across England, even if the NDR 
revenues record the same growth rate in all the councils (Amin-Smith et al., 2016). Indeed, 
under the new regulations only the cash baseline level of funding is protected. 
Amin-Smith et al. (2016) have estimated that 52 councils, mainly district councils with a small 
budget, have increased their income by more than 5%, whereas 119 councils, particularly the 
large county councils with a large budget, have recorded losses. Even councils with a 
noticeable commercial tax base were found to lose from the new scheme, due to certain 
impediments that negatively affected NDR revenues, such as backdated appeals which vary 
significantly across space (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017). The 75% and 100% retention 
schemes are projected to cause important divergence of funding available to the English 
councils (Amin-Smith et al., 2018). While under the previous system, the liability for appeals 
and mandatory reliefs was pooled by the UK Government, under the new scheme, based on 
the principle of sharing some costs and some benefits, English councils must internalise 50% 
of the liability in mandatory reliefs and 50% of the liability for outstanding appeals (Amin-Smith 
et al., 2016). Therefore, the National Audit Office (2017) has highlighted the risks that many 
English councils face regarding their ability to fund the local services, and that potential BRRS 
                                               
7 Under the new regulations only the cash baseline level of funding is protected. 
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effects on local economic growth have not been formally assessed prior to BRRS 
implementation. 
Scottish Government policy on business rates in Scotland 
The NDR scheme in Scotland has seen several changes in the last decade. Since 2011, in 
practical terms, the councils retain the whole amount of business rates income they generate 
(Scottish Parliament, 2015). In 2012, the business rates incentivisation scheme (BRIS) was 
established to provide the councils with incentives to increase their NDR revenues (Scottish 
Government, 2012). 
Since 2012, ‘each local authority that exceeds its individual non-domestic rate income target 
will retain a half share of the additional rates income generated. Those local authorities that 
do not reach their target will continue to be compensated by the Scottish Government’ 
(Scottish Government, 2012: 25). The local target is calculated based on the growth of RV, 
and subsequently of NDR. That is, if the RV rises above the target in a local authority, the 
council retains 50% of the additional NDR revenue and provides the rest to the Scottish 
Government (Amin-Smith et al., 2016). By contrast, if RV is lower than the target, then the 
amount provided by the Scottish Government increases to compensate the loss (Scottish 
Parliament, 2015). 
Under the Scottish system, the budgets of all the councils are protected as the Scottish 
Government adjusts the RSG in a way that councils receive at least the same amount of funds 
with the initial year of retention implementation (Amin-Smith et al., 2016). Councils are 
asymmetrically exposed to risk of not meeting their targets: they are rewarded for doing well, 
and are protected against performing poorly, thus weakening the marginal incentives for 
councils performing just under their target to grow their revenues. 
This incentivisation scheme has not generated large amounts of retained NDR revenue (Amin-
Smith et al., 2016). In 2012-13, out of the £2,346 million NDR generated, only £9 million 
(0.38%) was retained by 12 out of the 32 councils (Scottish Government, 2014). This amount 
declined to only £2.5 million for 2014-15 retained by 7 councils (Scottish Government, 2016). 
In 2015-16, the latest year that outturn data is available, £6.3 million was retained by 8 councils 
(Scottish Government, 2017b). 
Comparison of the English and Scottish NDR retention schemes 
Overall, local NDR revenue retention schemes in England and Scotland had different internal 
mechanics, yet both aimed at incentivising the growth of the local tax base. However, the 
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retention scheme in England has also created winners and losers, increased the vulnerability 
of many councils’ budgets, and split the councils between ‘premium’ and ‘redundant’ locations 
(Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). The key features and implications of the two retention 
schemes are summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: The NDR system and its implications in England and Scotland 
 Regulations Implications 
England 
(BRRS) 
 50% NDR retention, tariffs, top-
ups and levies 
 Retention of potential growth or 
loss of NDR 
 75% retention in 2020 
 Pilot implementation of 100% NDR 
retention in 10 counties, including 
Surrey and London in 2018-19 
 Exposure to upward and 
downward NDR revenue risk 
creates strong marginal 
incentives to grow tax base 
 Benefits for the councils with the 
biggest increases in their tax base 
in cash terms 
 Risk of uneven local funding 
(depending on which areas are 
more able to take advantage of 
the incentives created by 
business rates) 
Scotland 
(BRIS) 
 Councils receive back the whole 
amount of business rates income 
they generate 
 Councils are protected against 
underperformance 
 NDR growth incentivisation 
scheme 
 Protection against downward 
NDR revenue risk has not 
provided strong incentives to 
increase the tax base – marginal 
incentives exist for councils 
performing above target, but not 
for those performing below target 
 The scheme has not yet led to big 
amounts of revenues retained 
 
The underlying factor is that LAs record crucial differences in terms of the property market: 
various levels of non-domestic properties across space, spatially differentiated rateable 
values, and geographically varied reliefs (Greenhalgh et al., 2016). This implies that any 
localisation of a centrally managed local tax could entail a divergence of councils’ funding. 
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A hypothetical scheme of NDR retention at council level in 
Wales 
In 2011, before NDR were devolved, the Welsh Government tasked the Business Rates Task 
and Finish Group (TFG) to examine the way the NDR scheme could be configured in order to 
encourage and boost local economic growth. The report recommended, among other actions, 
the devolution and retention of NDR revenues and the adjustment of RSG to each council, in 
such a way that total funds available for each LA would not change (TFG, 2012). The Group 
proposed a 100% retention of NDR revenues for two years, which would then drop to 50%. It 
is worth noting that the TFG did not model the impact on individual LAs. The response of the 
Welsh Government was unenthusiastic. Although it highlighted that its priority is to create jobs 
and boost economic growth, recognising the economic significance of the link between the 
funds raised and spent by the councils, it postponed any decision about local retention of NDR 
revenues until the decision for NDR devolution to Wales was made (Welsh Government, 
2012b). 
In 2016, the WLGA and CIPFA tasked the Independent Commission on Local Government 
Finance in Wales (ICLGFW) to make recommendations for the reform of local government 
funding, taking account of the evolving devolution settlement for Wales (the Travers review). 
The ICLGFW (2016) suggested a 100% retention of NDR revenues from the 22 councils in 
order to facilitate more flexibility in local decision-making, promote self-reliance and 
entrepreneurship. Alongside the retention, the Commission suggested adjusting the RSG of 
each council in such a way that total funds available for each LA would not change. This RSG 
adjustment would be just for the initial year. After Year 1, councils could either gain or lose 
revenues according to the level of NDR they raised. With such a BRRS, councils would be 
incentivised to grow their local tax base income and achieve economic growth by investing 
funds to increase their number of NDP. The response of the Welsh Government was again 
negative as it ‘would benefit only a small number of authorities and would result in significant 
cuts to the budgets of the majority’ (Welsh Government, 2017a: 14). Overall, proposals of both 
reports were not specific in the sense that formulae were not brought forward and the schemes 
were not described in a systematic way. 
As a benchmark, we compute a simple NDR retention scheme, a hypothetical 100% retention 
of NDR without RSG adjustment. Under this simple scheme, some councils would see their 
revenue falling relative to a fully pooled system while others would record higher revenues. 
Such a hypothetical system could result in an increasing divergence between councils in their 
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relative income and spending (geographical impact). Councils with vibrant property markets, 
higher numbers of companies and higher property values, as well as bigger increases in local 
tax base, would be more likely to secure higher NDR revenue. By contrast, councils with less 
vibrant rental structures, lower numbers of enterprises and lower RV, as well as smaller 
increases in local tax base, would likely experience reduced revenues, irrespective of need 
for local services. Therefore, a simple 100% NDR retention scheme could increase the 
financial pressure on these councils regarding the delivery of basic social services provided 
at the local level across Wales (sectoral effect). 
The impact of a simple 100% NDR retention scheme without redistributive elements can be 
summarised as follows. Based on the average difference between the revenues under a 
simple 100% NDR retention and the NDR revenues under the existing Welsh scheme for each 
council over 2009-10 and 2015-16, eighteen councils would have seen their revenue falling, 
while only four would have seen a rise in their revenues. If the NDR retention had been applied 
since 2009-10, eleven councils would have seen their revenues falling drastically in all 
financial years (the average fall per head of population in these councils would be £79), seven 
LAs would have had mixed results (some years with positive and some years with negative 
difference) and only four councils would have recorded increased revenues at each year over 
the period. Figure 2 compares LA incomes under the existing NDR regime with the estimated 
revenues under the simple 100% NDR retention benchmark for each LA in 2015-16. 
It is important to note that this estimation does not model the NDR retention in Wales by 
councils and thus does not account any tariffs or top-ups, as the English system does. The 
aim of the calculation, demonstrated in Figure 2, is to highlight the redistributive mechanism 
of the current NDR system. In the actual application of a 100% retention to the Welsh councils, 
either the RSG should be adjusted or a mechanism of tariffs and top-ups should be 
established. 
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Figure 2: NDR revenue with and without simple 100% retention for each council, 2015-
16, £ thousands, cash terms 
 
Source: Stats Wales (2018) and authors’ calculations 
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The City Regions and Growth Deals in Wales 
Two developments have put the question of NDR retention back on the policy agenda. The 
full devolution of NDR to Wales from 2015-16 has given the Welsh Government the powers to 
make such reforms as it wishes. The encouragement of a more systematic approach to 
regional collaborations across local authorities for the purposes of economic development and 
delivery of some public services as a cornerstone for local government reform in Wales is 
creating a fresh context for thinking about NDR. 
Two recent economic development policy documents from the Welsh Government have both 
emphasised the importance of regional economic collaborations (Welsh Government 2017b 
& c). The UK and Welsh Governments have both responded positively to the establishment 
by local authorities and partners of City Regions in Wales in order to achieve sustainable, 
inclusive, and fair economic growth (Welsh Government, 2017b). There are two existing city 
region and growth deals, involving 14 councils in south and west Wales, a third is under 
negotiation for north Wales, involving 6 councils, and a final one is in prospect in Mid Wales 
(UK Government, 2017a). 
The Cardiff Capital Region City Deal (CCR) was signed in 2016 and is a partnership between 
the Welsh Government, the UK Government, and the councils for Cardiff, Vale of Glamorgan, 
Caerphilly, Blaenau Gwent, Newport, Monmouth, Torfaen, Bridgend, Rhondda Cynon Taf, and 
Merthyr Tydfil (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016). It has secured £1.3 billion of public investment 
and covers a period of 20 years, aiming at stimulating regional economic growth, reducing 
unemployment, upgrading people’s skills, and improving transportation (Economy, 
Infrastructure and Skills Committee, 2017). It is expected to deliver 25,000 jobs and attract £4 
billion of private sector investment. The projects included in the deal are funded by the Welsh 
Government (£500 million, provided from 2016-17 to 2022-23), the UK Government (£500 
million) and the ten local authorities (£120 million). The councils will contribute to the 
Investment Fund in proportion to their population. The projects of the CCR have not been set 
out in detail and are currently being specified. They are dominated by the South East Wales 
Metro (£725 million), involving the delivery of the Metro Central transport hub in Cardiff, a new 
coach and tram station, and four new train stations (Wentloog, Splott, Llanwern, and Roath). 
Moreover, CCR invested £37.9 million to build a factory for compound semiconductors in 
Newport (Cardiff Capital Region, 2017). Finally, the CCR is expected to invest in the 
development of a skilled workforce through actions that involve, among others, the 
establishment of the CCR Skills and Employment Board. 
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The Swansea Bay City Region (SBCR) deal was signed in 2017 and is a partnership between 
the Welsh Government, the UK Government, and the councils for Swansea, Neath Port Talbot, 
Carmarthenshire, and Pembrokeshire (Swansea Bay City, 2017). It has secured £600 million 
of public investment, and covers a period of 15 years, aiming at accelerating regional 
economic prosperity, developing jobs of high value and technology, and addressing the 
transformational economic power of digital networks (Economy, Infrastructure and Skills 
Committee, 2017). It is expected to increase the regional GVA by £1.8 billion and deliver 
10,000 new jobs. The Welsh Government and the UK Government will contribute up to £125.4 
and £115.6 million respectively, while the four councils, two universities and two health boards 
are expected to contribute £396 million to the Deal (Swansea Bay City, 2017). Specifically, 
the councils will contribute £240 million, through borrowing. The design of the projects is at a 
more advanced stage than the CCR, since SBCR and North Wales Growth Deal (NWGD) are 
growth deals. Therefore, their boards needed to present specific projects before the 
agreement with the UK and Welsh Government. The SBCR Deal involves eleven projects 
(total cost £1.274 billion), such as the Swansea City and Waterfront Digital District that will 
create incubation space for start-ups and small companies at the Swansea Waterfront 
development. Another project is the Skills and Talent Initiative, to improve people’s skills. 
Finally, the North Wales Growth Deal (NWGD) is currently under negotiation involving the 
councils for Flintshire, Wrexham, Denbighshire, Gwynedd, Isle of Anglesey, and Conwy. It 
seeks to secure £380 million of public capital investment from the UK and Welsh 
Governments, attract £1 billion of private sector investment, and create 5,300 jobs by 2035 
(UK government, 2017b). The suggested projects include, among other actions, the expansion of 
Wrexham’s industrial estate and the redevelopment of Holyhead Port (Gwynedd Council, 2017). 
It is clear that the city region and growth deals are a significant pillar of the regional economic 
development policy of the Welsh Government which has pre-allocated funding for these deals. 
However, the allocation of funding from the UK Government is guaranteed only for the first 
five years of the deals, with subsequent assessments (every five years) for unlocking further 
funding. These five-year windows mean that there is some uncertainty about future UK 
government funding over the longer term. However, the income that the City Regions are 
expected to generate, based on regional economic growth, could be seen as a long term 
funding stream. The rest of finance will be provided by the councils through borrowing (Cardiff 
Capital Region, 2016; Swansea Bay City, 2017). Finally, economic issues, such as Brexit, 
could imply unpredicted changes in funding allocation (Economy, Infrastructure and Skills 
Committee, 2017). Thus, the need for extra funding to carry out the city region deals becomes 
apparent. 
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The National Assembly for Wales Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee (2017) has 
identified three issues for the city region and growth deals in Wales. First, the positive impact 
of the city region schemes could be unevenly distributed across the Welsh regions, thus 
deepening the inequality within and among them. Second, there is a question about the risk 
of competition between the Welsh regions leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of business 
incentives, including NDR, with negative consequences for the economically disadvantaged 
regions (Bevan Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2017). Finally, it expressed 
concerns about the quality of collaboration within the regions, which could influence the impact 
the regions might have. 
Box 1: Main risks to City Regions in Wales 
1. Rising regional inequalities 
2. High regional competition 
3. Possibility of lack of funds 
4. Quality of collaboration 
Source: Bevan Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2017) and Economy, Infrastructure and 
Skills Committee (2017) 
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Options for a city-region shared-gain business rates 
incentivisation scheme in Wales 
This section discusses NDR retention that could be implemented in Wales, focusing on 
incentivisation schemes (partial retention) rather than a blanket retention. Two different 
models of incentivisation schemes are discussed at a city regional level: an application of the 
Scottish NDR incentivisation scheme and a project-based NDR incentivisation scheme. 
Suggestions for key issues to be considered to ensure that the incentivisation schemes are 
implemented effectively are discussed.  
Both City Regions in the south of Wales are advocating the retention of NDR revenues at city 
region level above a growth baseline to provide income for implementing the deals (Cardiff 
Capital Region, 2016; Swansea Bay City, 2017). In other words, they refer to a business rates 
growth incentivisation model. Specifically, the CCR seeks ‘the devolution of business rate 
income above an agreed growth baseline’ (Cardiff Capital Region, 2016: 6). The SBCR refers 
to a scheme based on business rates yields from projects financed through the city region 
deals. Specifically, it states that ‘there will be an opportunity for the additional business rate 
income to be utilised to support part of the revenue implications of these projects’ 
(Carmarthenshire County Council, 2017: 7). However, only loose details about the type of 
NDR retention suggested by the City Regions are available.  
If the Welsh Government were to introduce an NDR incentivisation scheme that protected the 
budget of all the councils and incentivised growth at the city regional level, then the mechanics 
and the implications of this scheme should be described and evaluated in detail, in order to 
avoid a situation similar to that in England where the reform of NDR model has not been 
formally assessed before its implementation (National Audit Office, 2017).  
The rationale for a city regional rather than a council-based NDR incentivisation approach is 
1) that in the city region case, the NDR raised is based on a number of selected councils, 
rather than individual councils, 2) that the scheme would still be local enough to take local 
variation into account, and 3) that it would build on the regional development aim of the city 
regions, as well as help mitigate potential increases in regional inequality as a consequence 
of the city regions. However, this approach also raises the question related to the way that the 
nature of the trade-offs between incentivising tax base growth and preventing widening 
regional inequality changes when moving from a council-based NDR incentivisation scheme 
to a regional NDR incentivisation scheme. 
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Option 1: Applying the Scottish NDR model to City Regions 
One simple option of an NDR retention scheme would be to take the Scottish model and apply 
it at the city regional level. The projects of the City Regions and the growth deals per se are 
expected to entail a significant uplift of the local tax base alongside a growth in economic 
activity, which would imply a rise in NDR revenue. Overall, this approach would take account 
of the overall growth in economic activity as reflected in business rate growth, so not just 
confined to capital projects. 
The suggested mechanics of applying a Scottish BRIS-type scheme to the Welsh City Regions 
are as follows: 
 In seeking to frame a policy scheme that does not disadvantage any council, there 
would be no change to the existing model of NDR revenue. In other words, the existing 
NDR scheme at the council level remains unchanged, and on top of this, a city regional 
BRIS is implemented. 
 The Welsh Government would set targets for the expected NDR revenue generation 
in the City Regions, aggregating the respective business rates generated in the 
councils of each city region. The NDR revenue target would be estimated using the 
historical average growth rate of business rates contribution in the councils of each city 
region: 3.16% for CCR, 3.94% for SBCR, and 2.78% for NWGD. 
 At the end of the financial year, the Welsh Government would assess whether the NDR 
revenue generation in a city region (based on outturn data) reached its target. If it 
exceeded the target, the city region would be allocated 50% of the revenues in excess 
of the target. The remaining 50% would be pooled by the Welsh Government with the 
NDR revenues from the existing scheme for redistribution through the existing 
population-based formula. 
 There are options for how the city region retained funds could be handled. One would 
be for the city region boards to allocate, on a collective basis, the retained NDR 
revenue towards the shared priorities, taking account of the need for economically 
disadvantaged councils to benefit. An alternative might be for the funds to be 
distributed to the participating councils as an incentive to them to approve the planning 
permission and facilitate wider development around city deal projects. 
 The city-region-driven NDR revenue, redistributed to the 22 councils, would be non-
ring-fenced. Councils could, for example, spend this revenue to increase the funding 
for the social services, or on other priorities. 
26 
 
 The fact that two councils are not included at the moment in city region deals at the 
moment, i.e. Powys and Ceredigion, should be considered. Thus, specific attention 
should be paid to the financial support of these two councils. 
Option 2: The project-based scheme 
Another option for a scheme would be a shared-gain approach to the growth of business rates 
at a city regional level based on the projects promoted by the city region which are related to 
non-domestic property use. These projects are expected to generate significant business 
rates revenues which will be additional to the existing NDR revenue. 
A scheme such as this might take the following broad shape: 
  The City Regions would retain the 50% of the NDR revenues that will be generated 
by the city region and growth deal projects. The remaining 50% is provided to the 
Welsh Government. 
 A scheme would need to clarify what properties are included in the scheme: 
a. non-domestic properties that are clearly included in the projects of the City 
Regions, such as the factory for compound semiconductors in Newport and the 
new train stations of the South East Wales Metro; 
b. companies that will be located in new premises funded by the City Regions, 
such as a store in one of the new train stations and a company in the Swansea 
Waterfront development; 
c. businesses attracted to premises not funded by the City Regions but close to 
the projects that were funded by them. For example, the Cardiff Metro Central 
transport hub is likely to attract new enterprises in the perimetric area. Whether 
these new companies would be included in the scheme, and for how long, or 
not would need to be clarified. 
 A scheme would need to include provisions for a number of situations summarised 
below (further detail is included in Annex 2): 
a. if aggregate baseline NDR revenue of the councils involved in a city region 
registered decline (say by more than -5% in a financial year); 
b. where city deal projects involve relocation, for example of an existing NDR-
generating business within the region;  
c. where buildings related to the city deal projects remain empty. 
 Each project, related to non-domestic use, that is approved in the city region deals, 
after the beginning of the incentivisation scheme, will be treated similarly to the projects 
that were present at the outset of the city region scheme. 
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 Two conditions related to the city region functioning could boost the efficiency of the 
scheme. First, the new developments, introduced in the new NDR retention model, 
could address basic social needs, satisfy sustainable economic growth conditions, and 
respect the environmental footprint. Second, the City Regions should minimise the risk 
of overbuilding, by not focusing only on new and speculative developments (Economy, 
Infrastructure and Skills Committee, 2017). Indeed, the retention of NDR and the 
subsequent efforts to increase non-domestic income through new floor space 
development could entail overbuilding (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). 
 The city regions would bear 50% of the liability for appeals related to NDP stemming 
from the projects included in the city region deals. Therefore, the councils in the city 
regions would face two different types of appeals. First, appeals arising from the 
current system, whereby the liability for appeals is pooled by the Welsh Government. 
Second, the appeals related to the projects of the suggested system, whereby the city 
regions have the 50% of the liability. This accounts for the benefits of the shared-gain 
scheme, based on a sharing financial risks principle. Similarly, the city regions would 
bear 50% of the liability for reliefs relating to SMEs, charities, and empty properties. 
 The rest of the suggestions regarding the use of the retained NDR revenue by the City 
Regions and the Welsh Government are the same as the first version of the scheme 
discussed above. 
Comparing the two options 
Summarily, in the Scottish-type scheme applied at the City Regions level, a target for NDR 
revenue based on historic (pre-City Region) growth would be applied. If the total City Region 
NDR revenue were to exceed this target, the City Region would retain 50% of the difference 
between the revenue collected and the target set.  
In the project-based scheme, half of the NDR revenue generated through the City Region 
projects would be retained at the City Region level. The implementation of the Scottish-type 
scheme might seem more straight-forward, due to the simpler model setup. Both the Scottish-
type and the project-based schemes are expected to have similar financial implications for 
Welsh councils. 
In the case of the project-based system, it should also be considered that a direct link between 
City Region capital projects and retention of the city-region-driven NDR may provide incentives 
for the City Regions to invest in property investment (potentially crowding out private 
investment and/or seeing resources diverted from investments that have higher returns but no 
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direct business rates revenues – e.g. investment in skills, transport, etc.), and skew City 
Region spending. Conversely, if the link between City Region projects and NDR retention were 
less direct, it may be difficult to police the boundaries between what counts as a City Region 
project, and what does not.  
Both Scottish-type and project-based approaches to NDR retention at the City Region level 
could also help mitigate the potential negative effects of the City Regions in terms of the 
potential widening of regional disparities.  
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The implications of the city-region shared-gain NDR 
incentivisation scheme for Wales 
Both the incentivisation schemes at city regional level discussed above have positive financial 
implications. In all cases, the city regions bring projects and revenues. This report argues that 
these projects and subsequent growth could be accompanied by NDR retention in order to 
boost the economic efficiency of the City Regions. 
Based on this, the NDR incentivisation scheme seeks to achieve five specific goals. First, to 
boost the chances of achieving the city region deals’ goals. Second, to overcome weaknesses 
of the city-regional planning, such as rising regional inequalities. Third, to incentivise economic 
growth. Fourth, to provide more flexibility to the regions to adapt to local funding challenges. 
Finally, to support the funding for local services. 
Importantly, in this report we do not argue whether the City Region NDR incentivisation 
scheme would result in extra NDR revenue, or whether the same NDR revenue would have 
been obtained through the City Regions but in the absence of incentivisation. If the City 
Regions developments are driving the NDR revenue growth, then retention may make little 
difference to the NDR revenues gained. The NDR revenues that would have been raised in 
the absence of retention could have been used to increase spending on local council services 
via the RSG, or on public services provided by the Welsh government.  
The funds from the incentivisation scheme could be used to support councils’ funding for city 
region deals projects in the short term, and, thus, to bring economic development to the city 
regions. In the long term, the retained NDR revenues could stimulate regional investment, for 
creating jobs, building infrastructure based on local needs, and, overall, promoting regional 
economic growth, which are the basic targets of the Welsh Government post-Brexit regional 
policy and of the city region deals (Welsh Government, 2017c). These benefits would be 
important considering that the local economic development spending has seen the highest 
percentage of local government spending cuts: it fell from £86 million in 2009-10 to £23 million 
in 2015-16, recording a 74% decline (Ogle et al., 2017). On these grounds, a city-region 
shared-gain model could increase the capability of the councils to respond creatively and 
flexibly to local issues. The financial benefits are multiplied when considering that the larger 
projects of the city region deals are expected to raise the property value of the local area, thus 
additionally increasing NDR revenues, from both the existing scheme and the proposed 
incentivisation scheme.  
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The city-region-driven NDR revenue is also important considering the possible loss of EU 
regional financing post-Brexit. While the UK Government has promised a Shared Prosperity 
Fund, only limited information about this fund is available, and it is not clear whether all of the 
funding that Wales currently receives from European Structural and Investment Funds would 
be covered. 
The city-region-driven funds from the proposed NDR incentivisation scheme could also be 
used to reduce councils’ debts and/or to finance the interest. This would be helpful because 
councils finance the current projects of the city region deals through borrowing (Cardiff Capital 
Region, 2016). 
The proposed NDR incentivisation scheme has further important positive implications. First, 
the budgets of all the 22 Welsh councils would be protected against a reduction in NDR 
revenues, and the city-region-driven income that would be redistributed from the proposed 
NDR scheme would increase the funding to local services and improve people’s lives across 
Wales. Second, the proposed scheme could provide incentives to city regions to increase the 
NDR revenue that they generate and retain, as each extra project would imply an increase in 
the councils’ local tax base. All the councils are expected to benefit. On one hand, councils 
with less buoyant property markets would benefit because the scheme suggests that the 50% 
of the city-region-driven NDR revenue be retained at the city regional level and then used in a 
way that benefits all the councils. On the other hand, the incentivisation scheme could also 
improve the likelihood that even councils with less buoyant property markets would attract new 
and big developments as the city region deal should involve projects in all the councils. In the 
absence of this scheme, the funds and projects would predominantly be directed to councils 
that are wealthy and attractive to investors. Third, the proposed scheme could boost growth 
in economically disadvantaged Welsh councils, as recommended by the Bevan Foundation 
and the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2017). In fact, the scheme seeks to strengthen the 
case for the spatially equal distribution of economic growth stemming from city regions and 
their projects. 
However, under a City Region NDR retention, a trade-off arises between how much 
redistribution is made and the incentive for individual councils to approve developments. How 
stark this trade-off is would depend on where the nexus of decision on development making 
lies (council level, more regional planning, or at the Welsh Government level, and how 
decisions about development are negotiated), and how much individual councils care about 
each other’s outcomes. 
Two factors strengthen the argument for a positive impact of the scheme on equality across 
the Welsh regions. First, the NDR multiplier should be the same for all the city regions in order 
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to minimise the risk of increasing regional competition, which has been identified as a basic 
concern with regard to the city regions deals. Second, the scheme suggests that the retained 
NDR revenues are allocated by the City Region boards towards the shared priorities, on a 
collective basis, taking account of the need for economically disadvantaged councils to benefit. 
Therefore, the incentivisation scheme aims at restricting regional inequalities, based on close 
working collaboration between the local councils, the city region boards, and the Welsh 
Government. 
Box 2: Main implications of the city-region shared-gain business rates incentivisation 
scheme 
 Funding for City Regions: investments, reduction of councils’ debt 
 Raising the property value of the local area, thus additionally increasing NDR 
revenue 
 Increasing the capability of the councils to respond creatively and flexibly to local 
issues 
 Incentivisation of local tax base and NDR revenue increase in all the councils 
 Mitigation of potential rise of regional inequalities 
 Minimising the risk of increasing regional competition 
 Avoiding the negative effects of NDR retention at the local level 
 Financial support for the local public services 
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Scenarios for the financial implications of the shared-gain 
scheme for the three City Regions in Wales 
This section discusses three scenarios that consider the financial implications of a shared-
gain NDR incentivisation (partial retention) scheme for the three city regions in Wales (CCR, 
SBCR, and NWGD). The scenarios show how much City Regions might expect to retain in 
NDR revenue under a shared-gains incentivisation scheme (a Scottish-type scheme or a 
project-based scheme, or any such scheme) depending on the increase of NDR income 
stemming from the establishment of the City Regions. Moreover, this report calculates the 
NDR revenue, resulting from the City Regions, that would be provided to the Welsh 
Government for redistribution.  
We do not use the scenarios to show who would lose or gain from the incentivisation scheme 
for the following reason. Councils and the Welsh Government would both gain from the 
scheme only if it is the incentivisation scheme itself that is driving overall NDR revenue growth 
through faster growth in the City Region tax base. But, if the City Region developments 
themselves (and not rates retention) are driving the NDR revenue growth, then the Welsh 
government would have also received that revenue growth in the absence of rates retention. 
In that counterfactual, the Welsh Government could have used that NDR revenue stemming 
from City Regions developments to increase the Revenue Support Grant to councils, leading 
to a redistribution between councils and the Welsh Government and resulting in winners and 
losers. In this report we do not model this counterfactual, and do not seek to estimate the net 
impact of the incentivisation scheme at the City Region level. 
The scenarios calculate the amount of city-region-driven NDR revenues retained by the City 
Regions for financing the needs of each City Region, and the city-region-driven NDR revenues 
provided to the Welsh Government, for redistribution among the 22 councils. The NDR 
revenue growth in Box 3 is assumed to stem from the City Region developments (not in 
addition to City Region developments). The scenarios demonstrate how the City Regions and 
the Welsh Government split the NDR revenues resulting from the City Regions.  
It should also be noted that these scenarios are not forecasts or predictions of what will happen 
after the establishment of the City Regions and after considering the top-up impact of the 
incentivisation. Instead, they are ‘what-if’ projections based on the existing knowledge and 
trends about NDR revenue generation. 
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Box 3: Scenarios for the NDR incentivisation scheme 
 
 
The first scenario refers to a growth in NDR revenues of 1% in cash terms for every year in 
the three city regions, after removing the reliefs and appeals, the second scenario assumes a 
3% growth in business rates generated in the CCR, SBCR, and NWGD, and the third scenario 
refers to a 5% growth in NDR revenues.8, 9, 10, 11 The scenario-making process begins from the 
next possible financial year of the scheme’s implementation, 2019-20, and extends to 2021-
22. The latest available data for NDR at the council level is for the financial year 2017-18 
(estimates, rather than outturns). 
Unfortunately, forecasts for future NDR revenue generation for each council are not available. 
Therefore, the numbers used in this report for future NDR revenue generation for each city 
region are based on the average NDR revenue growth rate for those regions12 from 2000-01 
to 2015-16.13 Figure 3 compares the three scenarios with the status quo: no operation of the 
City Regions and no retention at the city regional level. In other words, the baseline trend is 
the projected NDR generation in the councils comprising the three City Regions, and the three 
                                               
8 The 1%, 3%, and 5% growth rate in each scenario was based on the average growth rate of NDR in each city 
region between 2000-01 and 2017-18: 3.16% for CCR, 3.94% for SBCR, and 2.78% for NWGD. 
9 The specific levels if NDR rise are above CPI. 
10 This income becomes more important considering that the Welsh Government has not accounted for NDR 
income from the city region projects in its projections for NDR revenues in the short-term future, as these projects 
are at an initial stage.  
11 Brexit and its possible implications should be considered when calculating NDR revenue projections. However, 
at present, the uncertainty surrounding possible Brexit implications is too high to include in the modelling and is 
therefore beyond the scope of this report. 
12 It should be mentioned that NDR growth in Wales overall and in the three city regions is rather volatile with high 
standard deviation and coefficient of variation values. 
13 The projections for the NDR income generated in each council were double-checked by employing the linear 
trend line projection method (Black, 2012). The results were very similar to the method based on average growth 
rate used in this report. 
City Regions retain 50% of the city-region-driven NDR revenues, assuming that either: 
 NDR revenue increases by 1% for every year in the three city regions, after 
removing the reliefs and appeals, or; 
 NDR revenue increases by 3% per year, other conditions as above, or; 
 NDR revenue increases by 5% per year, other conditions as above. 
The Welsh Government collects the remaining 50% of the city-region-driven NDR 
revenues and pools them alongside other NDR collected. These NDR are then 
redistributed to the 22 councils alongside the RSG. 
The increase in NDR revenues comes in from 2019-20, and is modelled to 2021-22. 
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scenarios show how much of the NDR revenues stemming from the City Regions the City 
Regions and the Welsh Government would retain, depending on the NDR revenue growth 
rate.  
In all three scenarios, the retained NDR income ranges from £1 million to £13 million, for all 
city regions (see Annex 23 for details).14 Under scenario 1, CCR would retain £2.7 million in 
2021,15 while the SBCR would retain £1.2 million, and the NWGC – £1.176 million. Under 
scenario 2, CCR would retain £8.2 million in retained NDR revenues, SBCR – £3.7 million, 
and NWGD – £3.6 million in 2021-22. The cumulative impact of the city-region-driven NDR 
revenues should also be considered. For instance, scenario 3 would result in the retention of 
£40 million of NDR revenues for the CCR between 2019-20 and 2021-22. Considering that 
the agreed total amount of the 20-year borrowing for the 10 CCR councils is £120 million, the 
£40 million could cover a third of the cost of this borrowing, in just the first three years of 
implementation of the incentivisation scheme (2019-20 to 2021-22), if the conditions for 
scenario 3 were to hold. Recall that these retained revenues do not take into account what the 
same regions would have received if the City Regions developments had gone forward but 
rates retention was not introduced. 
                                               
14 In order to estimate the retained NDR revenue generated in the region, the model that was used is the following: 
𝑌𝑟,𝑡 =  𝑎𝛸𝑟,𝑡 ∗ 0.5 
Where Yr,t is the city-region-driven business rates generated in region r in year t, Xr,t is the projected NDR income 
generated in region r in year t without the city-regional retention scheme, and 𝑎 is the rate of increase of NDR 
income in each scenario. 
15 For instance, the semiconductor factory is expected to contribute £172,000 of NDR revenues for CCR in one 
year, based on the poundage for 2018-19. 
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Figure 3: Projected NDR generation in the CCR based on the three scenarios, £ millions, 
cash terms 
 
Source: Stats Wales (2018) and authors’ calculations 
 
The Welsh Government would add the city-region-driven NDR revenue to the pooled NDR 
revenue from the existing scheme and redistribute total NDR revenues to all councils to fund 
local services. Table 4 shows the amount of city-region-driven NDR revenue that would be 
provided to the Welsh Government under each of the three scenarios. For example, under 
scenario 1, the Welsh Government would receive £4.7 million in 2019-20, while under scenario 
3 it could collect £24.3 million in the same year. Cumulatively, the Welsh Government could 
receive £75 million in NDR revenue under scenario 3 over 2019-20 to 2021-2022. It is worth 
noting that this city-region-driven NDR revenue would not be sufficient to reverse the trend of 
underfunding of local government in Wales, which has faced significant budget cuts and 
pressures over the last few years (Ogle et al., 2017). Again, we reiterate that the city-region-
driven NDR income received by the Welsh Government does not take into account what the 
Welsh Government would have received if the City Regions developments had gone forward 
but rates retention was not introduced. 
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Table 4: City-region-driven NDR income received by the Welsh Government based on 
the three scenarios, in £ millions, cash terms 
 
2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 
Scenario 1 (1% annual NDR revenue growth) 4.9 5.0 5.2 
Scenario 2 (3% annual NDR revenue growth) 14.6 15.1 15.5 
Scenario 3 (5% annual NDR revenue growth) 24.3 25.1 25.9 
Source: Stats Wales (2018) and authors’ calculations 
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Conclusion  
The aim of this report was to examine the current model of business rates in Wales and to 
explore possible NDR retention and incentivisation schemes, thus participating in the policy 
debate around local and regional finance in Wales. It analysed existing research on NDR 
retention in England and Scotland, considered the potential impact of an NDR retention 
scheme on Welsh NDR revenues, and discussed how a regional approach to a possible 
shared-gain business rates incentivisation scheme in Wales might be introduced. 
This report has shown that the current NDR scheme in Wales, where councils’ NDR revenues 
are pooled and redistributed by the Welsh Government alongside the Revenue Support Grant, 
financially supports disadvantaged councils. The councils that receive more revenues than 
they contribute tend to be the less developed and rural LAs, with higher levels unemployment 
and lower levels of average earnings. By contrast, the wealthy and urbanised councils 
contribute higher amounts of business rates than they receive. 
However, there is a crucial trade-off between redistribution and incentives to grow a region’s 
(and council’s) tax base. The more the NDR retention system results in redistribution, the 
higher the chance of keeping widening regional disparity under control, but the lower the 
incentives to grow the tax base. The more the NDR retention system encourages incentives 
to grow the tax base, the more it opens councils (and regions) to risk, and may come at the 
cost of increased regional disparity. Policymakers will need to make a decision about the 
optimal mix between redistribution and incentives in designing an NDR retention system. 
Furthermore, introducing a new regional level between individual councils and the Welsh 
Government, may address some of the risks of NDR retention at the council level, but 
introduces questions about at which level decisions about regional development lie. 
The discussion of changes to the business rates system in Wales has focused on how 
business rates are calculated, the NDR appeals system, and the NDR relief schemes. Two 
reports published in the mid-2010s recommended that NDR revenue should be retained in 
Wales, during a period that NDR retention was implemented in Scotland and England. In 
Scotland, NDR retention was accompanied by an incentivisation scheme at the local level, 
which has so far had limited effects on NDR revenues. The BRRS in England has the potential 
to benefit the budgets of the developed councils with vibrant property markets and the biggest 
increases in the local tax base, thus exacerbating the risk of regional development 
polarisation. Therefore, if Wales were to implement an NDR revenue retention scheme at the 
council level similar to the English system, it could suffer from similar detrimental effects on 
local finance from a geographical and sectoral perspective. A council-level NDR revenue 
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retention scheme would likely result in less income for councils with underdeveloped property 
markets and more revenues for the councils with buoyant rental structure (geographical 
impact). It would also increase the financial pressure to councils with reduced income 
regarding the delivery of basic social services, while also raising the risk of overbuilding 
(sectoral impact). 
The emergence of city regions in Wales has put NDR retention schemes back on the policy 
agenda, but from a different perspective: retention of the city-region-driven NDR income at the 
city-regional level. The city regions were established in Wales as important investment 
initiatives aiming at improving regional economic development and employment growth. 
However, city regions also have the potential to lead to deeper intra- and inter-regional 
inequalities, based on fierce regional competition. 
If the city region schemes are anticipated to be a major driver of future economic activity in 
Wales and if the Welsh Government decides to promote an NDR incentivisation model, then 
a city-region shared-gain business rates incentivisation scheme, discussed in this report, 
could help the city regions to achieve their aims and boost local finance. The central 
suggestion made in this report takes account of the overall growth in economic activity as 
reflected in business rate growth. The Welsh Government would set targets for the expected 
NDR income generation in each city region, and the city region would retain 50% of the 
revenues in excess of the target. An alternative version of the partial NDR retention model is 
that 50% of NDR revenues generated by the non-domestic properties stemming from the city 
regions deals projects, over and above the NDR revenues that would have been raised in the 
regions in the absence of the city region projects, should be retained at the city region level. 
The retained NDR income by city regions in both models would be allocated, on a collective 
basis, towards the shared priorities of the City Regions, such as funding city region 
investments or reducing councils’ level of debt, taking account of the need for economically 
disadvantaged councils to benefit. The calculation of the city-region-driven NDR revenues is 
based on the assumption of the same poundage for all the city regions. It is important to 
mention that the projects, introduced in the city regions, should address basic social needs, 
while the city region boards should minimise the risk of overbuilding and ensure that all 
councils comprising the city regions gain from the proposed projects. The city regions would 
send the other 50% of the city-region-driven NDR income to the Welsh Government, which 
would in turn redistribute these revenues alongside the existing NDR revenues, to the Welsh 
councils. This NDR income could, for example, financially support social services provided by 
the councils. This scheme has the potential to support local and regional economic growth, 
mitigate regional inequalities, restrict the negative impacts of regional competition, and back 
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the provision of local services, especially in the case that the incentives actually generate 
faster growth in the tax base.  
Overall, this report does not offer easy solutions to the problems of reduced local finance and 
regional economic development. However, its key messages raise important issues to 
consider to avoid the potential negative effects of local NDR retention and seek to mitigate 
regional disparities. Following the spirit of the suggestions made in this report, a well-
implemented NDR incentivisation model could improve the distribution of city regions gains 
across Wales and share city regional strategy benefits among all the Welsh councils and their 
citizens. 
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Annex 1 
Figure 4: Difference of NDR settlements-contributions for the 22 Welsh LAs, 2000-01 to 2015-16, £ thousands, cash terms 
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Annex 2 
 If aggregate NDR revenue under the existing scheme of the councils involved in a city region records a decline by more than -5% in a 
financial year, then in that year the city regions could not retain the 50% of business rates revenue from the city region projects; by 
contrast 100% of this City-Region-raised NDR could be provided to the Welsh Government for redistribution. 
 In case of relocation of a company from an NDP that arises from a named City Region project to another NDP that may still be in the 
City Region but not part of the project, the NDP could end to be part of the incentivisation scheme. 
 In the case of delocalisation, whereby a company moves from a location of the city region to premises of a city region project: this NDP 
could then become part of the incentivisation scheme. 
 In the case that buildings related to the city regions projects remain empty: this NDP could not be part of the incentivisation scheme, 
since the City Regions will be under financial pressure to finance the relief. 
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Annex 3 
 
Table 5: Three scenarios for the generation and retention of business rates revenues under the suggested NDR scheme, based on 
NDR average growth rate projections 
 NDR generation (£ millions) Retained NDR income (£ millions) 
Retained NDR income as % of 
average GVA growth (1998-2016) 
 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 Total 2019-20 2020-21 2021-22 
CCR 
(current 
scheme) 
486 509 486 501 516 531 547   
Scenario 1 486 509 486 501 521 536 552 2.57 2.65 2.73 7.96 0.33 0.34 0.35 
Scenario 2 486 509 486 501 531 547 563 7.73 7.96 8.20 23.90 0.98 1.01 1.04 
Scenario 3 486 509 486 501 541 558 574 12.89 13.27 13.67 39.84 1.64 1.69 1.74 
SBCR 
(current 
scheme) 
211 218 212 220 229 238 248   
Scenario 1 211 218 212 220 231 240 250 1.14 1.19 1.23 3.57 0.37 0.39 0.40 
Scenario 2 211 218 212 220 236 245 255 3.43 3.57 3.71 10.71 1.11 1.16 1.21 
Scenario 3 211 218 212 220 240 250 260 5.72 5.95 6.18 17.86 1.86 1.93 2.01 
NWGD 
(current 
scheme) 
203 211 217 223 229 235 242   
Scenario 1 203 211 217 223 231 238 244 1.14 1.17 1.2 3.53 0.35 0.36 0.37 
Scenario 2 203 211 217 223 236 242 249 3.43 3.52 3.62 10.59 1.04 1.07 1.10 
Scenario 3 203 211 217 223 240 247 254 5.72 5.88 6.04 17.64 1.73 1.78 1.83 
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